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Laboratory Animal Act: A Legislative 
Proposal 
David Favre* 
I. Introduction 
In one recent experiment, mongrel dogs were anesthetized 
after which thirty-five percent of their body was burned to the 
third degree by the application of a two hundred degree centi-
grade hot plate to their skin.1 In 1983, researchers at the New 
Jersey Medical School placed electrodes in the hippocampus 
portion of the brains of five female cats. The brain was stimu-
lated with electrical current to determine whether or not there 
was an increase in the tendency of the cat to bite at an anes-
thetized rat.• Researchers at Georgia State University divided 
a group of ten infant chimpanzees into pairs and triads. Two 
weeks later the pairs were split and one from each of the tri-
ads was isolated. The study was designed to measure the de-
gree of "protest" behavior and the reunion responses. In the 
researcher's own words, "the results of this study indicated 
that chimpanzees react in predictable ways to separation from 
cage mates ... the data on separation of chimpanzees are in-
termediate between those of humans and monkeys. "3 
The above examples of animal use are neither unique nor 
isolated. Are they examples of the incremental steps necessary 
• Professor David S. Favre teaches at the Detroit College of Law in Detroit, 
Michigan. He ia a national board member of the Animal Legal Defense Fund and haa 
written on a number of animal related topics. 
1. Animal Welfare Institute, Beyond ·the Laboratory Door 140 (1985) (citing 
Wolfe, Effect of Thermal Injury on Energy Metabolism, Substrate Kinetics, and 
HormoMl Concentrations, 9 Circulatory Shock 383 (1982)). 
2. /d. at 183-84 (citing Wa~n, An AMlysis of the Mechanics Underlying Hip-
pocamal Control of Hypothalamically-elicited Agression in the Cat, 269 Brain Re-
search 327 (1983)). 
3. /d. at 229-30 (citing Bard & Nadler, The Effect of Peer Separation in Young 
Chimpanzees, 5 Am. J. of Primatology 25 (1983)). 
123 
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for the advancement of science or are they unjustified inflic-
tion of pain and suffering best characterized as torture? The 
application of a hot plate or the use of electricity on a living 
animal by a person would, in a different circumstance, most 
likely violate state cruelty laws." Presently, within our society, 
there is a wide range of perspectives on this issue. Some indi-
viduals believe any use of animals in experiments is ethically 
unacceptable regardless of the human motivation.6 Others 
would leave such decisions entirely in the hands of the scien-
tist, behind the laboratory door.6 Still others would argue that 
while the use of animals may be necessary for science, there is 
presently too much wastefulness, too much repetition, and 
that it is unacceptable to inflict pain and suffering on 
animals.1 
To pursue these ethical issues requires the opening of the 
historically closed laboratory door to public and governmental 
observation. Most reflective people are willing to agree that 
animals should not suffer pain needlessly.8 The key issue has 
4. See State v. Tweedie, 444 A.2d 855 (R.I. 1982) (upholding a conviction for 
cruelly killing where the defendant put a cat in a microwave oven and turned it on); 
Anderton v. State, 390 So. 2d 1083 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (in which the defendant 
was convicted of killing, by burning with gasoline, three two-week-old puppies). 
5. One organization against all use of animals in research is the International 
Society for Animal Rights. The organization recently announced, "ISAR is willing 
and eager to work with other organizations of a like mind in a vigorous campaign 
against experimentation on animals." Int'l Soc'y for Animal Rights Rep., Editorial: 
Startergy and Pressure Points 2 (Aug. 1985) (available from International Society for 
Animal Rights, Inc., 421 South State Street, Clarks Summit, Pa. 18411). 
6. In testimony before Congress, Dr. Walter Randall representing the American 
Physiological Society stated, "(t]he society maintains its position that restrictive leg-
islation is not needed." Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act: Hearings 
on S. 657 Before Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, & Forestry, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
48 (1983). 
7. The Scientists Center for Animal Welfare, established in 1979, 
is dedicated to the principle that a humane concern for animals should be 
incorporated into our conduct of science. The Scientists Center's outlook is 
one of responsible inquiry - seeking the best possible reconciliation of human 
needs with concern for the needs and well-being of all other animals. The 
Center recognizes that there is a need for the use of live animals in biomedi-
cal research and holds that high standards of animal welfare complement the 
quality of scientific results. 
Scientists Center for Animal Welfare, Brochure (1985-1986). 
8. In a statement made before the House of Representatives one of the Associate 
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always been who should decide when pain is necessary, and in 
accordance with what standards is the decision to be made. 
Today, as in the past, individual scientists make the decision 
on a case by case basis with some oversight by a peer review 
process. The government has bowed to the demands of re-
search scientists who wish to be free in their choice of re-
search technique. 9 Would the imposition of government regu-
lation be constitutional? Would government regulation stifle 
scientific research, killing the golden goose? 
This article proposes new legislation which would reduce 
the pain and suffering of animals to a minimum while al-
lowing maximum flexibility for the researcher. The primary 
legal mechanism for accomplishing this goal is a federal per-
mit system. Under this system, rather than trying to control 
all animal research, permits will be required only for specifi-
cally listed techniques which produce pain and suffering in 
animals and any use of primates. 
Before describing the specific provisions of my Labora-
tory Animal Act (LAA), some background may be useful. 
First, a brief examination of present laws will show how little 
Directors of the National Institute of Health said: 
In appearance before this panel last October, I said, "It is almost impos-
sible to exaggerate the importance of laboratory animals in the search for 
new or improved means to prevent, treat and cure human disease. Virtually 
every major advance in health care stems in whole or in part from research 
performed with animals." 
Such research is essential if we are to continue to make progress toward 
overcoming such maladies as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, brain dysfunc-
tion and environmentally caused disorders. 
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I emphasized that the social imperative 
that calls for the use of animals in research "is not a license to take animals' 
lives needlessly, or tO inflict pain and suffering that could reasonably be 
avoided. Abuse of laboratory animals is as inconsistent with good science as 
it is with good conscience." 
I believe that the vast majority of the scientific community and the gen-
eral public shares that view. 
Humane Care and Development of Substitutes for Animals in Research Act: 
Hearings on H.R. 6245 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology 
of the Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) (testimony of 
William F. Raub). 
9. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of the 
proposed act will be considered. 
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regulation exists to govern the use of animals for scientific 
purposes. Second, a legal frame of reference for the regulation 
of scientific experimentation will be developed. Third, an ethi-
cal perspective for animals will be considered. 
II. Present Legal Structures 
A. State Regulation of Experimentation on Animals 
Current law regards animals as personal property. Under 
state law their status as living personal property is recog-
nized, 10 and a minimum standard of humane care is generally 
provided for. The starting point for analysis is the state cru-
elty law.11 These criminal law provisions, with roots back into 
the 1880's and 1890's, contain general language which apply to 
human conduct but usually make no specific reference to the 
use of animals in the laboratory.12 In a majority of states, 
there is no exception or special provision for the use of ani-
mals in research and testing.13 While phrases such as "tor-
ture", "unjustifiably injure", and "cruelly beat or needlessly 
10. "A dog, for all its admirable and unique qualities, is not a human being and 
is not treated in the law as such. A dog is personal property, ownership of which is 
recognized under the law." Arrington v. Arrington, 613 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1981). 
Animals are a unique classification of personal property in that they have the 
ability to move of their own volition; they will, with a certain regularity, pro-
duce more of the same; they require care. In sum, they are alive, and being so 
gives rise to several unique considerations within personal property law .... 
All animals within the boundaries of the United States are in theory the 
property of either a private individual (any legal entity) or the state. 
D. Favre & M. Loring, Animal Law 21 (1983). 
11. For a full analysis of typical state cruelty laws, see D. Favre & M. Loring, 
Animal Law 121-66 (1983). 
12. For example, the Mississippi cruelty law remains today basically the same as 
it was when initially passed in 1880. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-1 (1973 & Supp. 1985). 
13. A 1984 survey found that in twenty-three states research received some level 
of protection from the general application of state cruelty laws. Assoc. for Biomedical 
Research, State Laws Concerning the Use of Animals in Research 13-15 (1st ed. 1984) 
(available from Association of Biomedical Research, 400-2 Totten Pond Rd., Suite 
200, Waltham, Mass. 02154). A student review of the various statutes suggests that 
thirty-four states have rejected the use of an express exemption of researchers from 
cruelty statutes. Note, Taub v. State: Are State Anti-Cruelty Statutes Sleeping Gi-
ants? 2 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 255, 268 (1984). 
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mutilate" often appear in state criminal law, 14 it is difficult to 
apply such general terms to the specific activities of a scien-
tist. What is clearly cruel or unjustifiable to one person, such 
as the intentional burning of the skin of guinea pigs, 16 is not 
to another. The end result is that state cruelty laws have had 
negligible impact on the activities of science and animal test-
ing. In fact, there is only one recorded case of a scientist being 
charged and convicted under a state cruelty law, and in that 
case the conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. 16 
The cruelty laws of a number of states, such as Virginia17 
and California, 18 provide a simple exemption for scientific re-
search. Other states, such as Michigan and Massachusetts, 
have set up affirmative provisions governing some aspect of 
the use of animals in research. Michigan has created an 
animal research advisory board within the Department of 
Health.19 This board may "establish standards ... controlling 
the humane use of animals."20 The regulations adopted in 
Michigan focus on the appropriate use of drugs and the post 
experimental care of animals. Incorporated into the regula-
tions by reference is the Guide for the Care and Use of Labo-
ratory Animals.21 While this guide is eighty-one pages long, it 
14. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 97-41-1 (1973 & Supp. 1985). 
15. Animal Welfare Institute, supra note 1, at 136-40. 
16. Taub v. State, 296 Md. 439, 463 A.2d 819 (1983). Edward Taub was con-
ducting research on monkeys which entailed surgically abolishing all sensation in the 
limb of a monkey (deafferentation). He was found guilty of failure to provide neces-
sary veterinary care, but this conviction was overturned when the highest court in 
Maryland, in a very unclear opinion, held that the legislature had not meant for the 
general cruelty statute to apply to scientific research even though no language could 
be found in the statute supporting this conclusion. See, Note, supra note 13, at 255. 
17. The general cruelty language is qualified by the phrase "not connected with 
bona fide scientific or medical experimentation." Of course, there is no hint as to 
what makes something "bona fide." Va. Code § 29-213.91 (1985). 
18. The phrase in the California Code is "or with properly conducted scientific 
experiments or investigations performed under the authority of the faculty of a regu-
larly incorporated medical college or university of this state." Cal. Penal Code 
§ 599(c) (West 1970). 
19. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2672 (West 1980). 
20. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2673 (West 1980). The regulations are located 
in Mich Admin. Code R. § 325.921-.926 (1980). 
21. Public Health Service National Institutes of Health, U.S. Dep't of Health & 
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does not provide much in the way of detailed standards of 
care for animals. The primary focus is on the housing of ani-
mals rather than the scientific techniques or procedures which 
may be used in experiments. The Michigan regulations, which 
cover all vertebrate animals, do require inspections on an an-
nual basis. 22 
In 1983, Massachusetts passed a new law which allows the 
commissioner of the Department of Public Health to adopt 
regulations for the licensing and inspection of research insti-
tutions that use dogs and cats. 28 The regulations adopted by 
the state are very close to the national regulations adopted 
under the federal Animal Welfare Act. 24 
B. Federal Regulation of Experimentation on Animals 
At the federal level there is one primary law which di-
rectly affects the conditions of animals in a laboratory: the 
Animal Welfare Act. 211 Although extensive regulations have 
been adopted by the Department of Agriculture,26 the concern 
is upon the housing of animals rather than what is done to the 
animal by the scientist. For example, the law requires mini-
mum standards for food, water, sanitation, ventilation, shelter 
and veterinary care.27 The law does require the use of pain-
relieving drugs when pain is present but also provides a large 
loophole by further stating that such drugs need not be used 
if their use would interfere with the purpose of the experi-
ment. 28 This situation is precisely what Congress desired. 
During the congressional debate it was made clear that there 
Human Services, Pub. No. 85-23, Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals 
(1985). 
22. "'Animal' means any living, vertebrate animal." Mich. Admin. Code R. 
§ 325.921(1)(a) (1980). 
23. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 140 § 174 D (West Supp. 1986). 
24. Mass. Admin. Code tit. 105 §§ 910.001-.210 (1984). 
25. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
26. 9 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-3.142 (1986). 
27. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1982). 
28. "[l]n any practice which could cause pain to animals ... the withholding of 
tranquilizers, anesthesia, or euthanasia when scientifically necessary shall continue 
for only the necessary period of time .... " 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(3) (1982), amended by 7 
U.S.C.S. § 2143(a)(3)(C)(i-v) (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1986). 
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was to be no interference with research and experimenta-
tion.s9 Congress did not seek to distinguish between interfer-
ing with scientific research and controlling the methods used 
in doing research. 
Not only is the Animal Welfare Act limited in the activi-
ties that it covers, but it is also limited by its definition of the 
term "animal". The law itself lists specific animals (dogs, cats, 
primates, etc.) and then allows the Secretary of Agriculture to 
designate other warm blooded animals. 30 The same subsection 
of the law, however, excludes all farm animals used in food 
and fiber research from the protection of the law. A further 
narrowing occurs in the regulations. The Secretary specifically 
excludes birds, rats and mice in the regulatory definition of 
"animal".31 Ironically, these species represent the three most 
used species in research and testing. as Thus, existing federal 
law provides animals with protection only in the area of hous-
ing, and some of the species receive no protection at all. 
Although not part of any law, there is normally a peer 
review process both at the institution where research occurs 
and during the grant review when N.I.H. grants are involved. 
Undoubtedly, some concern is given to animals and their pain 
and suffering during these reviews, but the published litera-
ture continues to show the use of experimental techniques 
ethically unacceptable to many.33 Additionally, it may be pre-
sumed that a number of lesser quality research projects in-
volving great pain and suffering to animals are either never 
29. For example, consider the commentary of Senator Monroney: 
Let me make it crystal clear that this bill in no way will impair the rights of 
researchers and the managers of research facilities to subject animals to med-
ical or surgical procedures required for research and experimentation. . . . 
The researcher is left completely free to use an animal in his research project 
in whatever way, no matter how painful, and for as long as he deems neces-
sary, including removing any organs or vital parts, or even experimentation 
that he knows will result in the death of the animal. 
112 Cong. Rec. 813893 (daily ed. June 22, 1966). See also 112 Cong. Rec. H9210 
(daily ed. April 28, 1966) (statement of Rep. Pepper). 
30. 7 u.s.c. § 2132(g) (1982). 
31. 9 C.F.R. § l.l(n) (1986). 
32. See infra note 49. 
S3. See generally Animal Welfare Institute, supra note 1, at 121-250 (for a re-
view of the scientific literature). 
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written up or never accepted for publication and thus remain 
totally hidden from the public. 
At the moment neither the state nor the federal laws di-
rectly address the issue of when, if ever, it is appropriate to 
intentionally inflict pain and suffering on animals under the 
argued need of scientific research. It is now time to develop a 
legal framework in which it is possible to control or regulate 
the use of animals by science. It is such a legal framework 
which is being proposed herein. 
III. The Regulation of Science 
Science, both as a truth seeking intellectual activity and 
as a producer of information upon which our technological so-
ciety is based, is a fundamental component of western culture, 
particularly that of the United States.84 As a definition of sci-
ence, Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel laureate, has suggested 
the following: 
The profession of science is the search for truths about 
the natural world; more precisely it seeks verifiable gener-
alizations that simplify human comprehension and pre-
diction of natural phenomena. Still more must be said: 
the truths must be novel and significant - which is to 
suggest that they are measured according to their impact 
on the minds of other scientists, a statement which labels 
science firmly as a human and social enterprise. 81 
34. Favre & McKinnon, The New Prometheus: Will Scientific Inquiry Be Bound 
by the Chains of Government Regulation?, 19 Duq. L. Rev. 651, 712-27 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as Prometheus). 
35. Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science: Notes from the Ivory 
Tower, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 596, 599 (1972). Dr. Lederberg received the Nobel Prize for 
Medicine in 1958. With a slightly different focus, Ralph E. Lapp described science: 
The goals of science focus upon the exploration of the unknown and the 
enlargement of knowledge. Very often the greatest discoveries come when a 
man sees relationships between things which no one recognized before-or 
sees these in a new light. But usually science expands into the unknown like 
a huge amoeba, moving first this way and then that, seeking the virgin and 
the fertile. Its goals are determined by opportunity and chance and some-
times by design: 
R. Lapp., The New Priesthood 1-2 (1965). 
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Science is, in the first instance, the creative use of individual 
minds. 38 As with many creative activities, breakthroughs are 
unpredictable; new developments do not arrive like completed 
cars at the end of the assembly line. Likewise, it is impossible 
to know, in advance, which individuals will produce useful 
new insights about nature. Therefore, to maximize the "out 
put" of science there should be minimal, if any, control on 
who is a scientist or what issues he or she might pursue. 
Freedom to research, freedom to choose the topic of re-
search, freedom to choose the method of research, all of these 
are essential to the individual scientist. This author and 
others have previously argued that scientific research in gen-
eral is so important that it is protected by the U.S. Constitu-
tion from unwarranted government intervention. 37 The basis 
of this constitutional protection would be either as a compo-
nent of free speech under the first amendment, or as a funda-
mental right. One author has argued that because the basic 
attribute of science is the expression of ideas and opinions, 
scientific research is pure speech.38 It may be more useful to 
bring the research aspects of science within the scope of con-
stitutional protection as a necessary incident to speech or as 
"speech plus". 39 
From another perspective, scientific inquiry can be con-
sidered as a fundamental right standing alone. Other rights 
have been recognized by the Supreme Court as fundamental 
even though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. 40 
36. See J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values 13-15 (1965). See generally J. 
Bronowski, The Origins of Knowledge and Imagination (1978); T. Kuhn, The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolution (1969). 
37. Prometheus, supra note 34, at 651. See also Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo 
and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 Wash. 
L. Rev. 349 (1978); Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1203 (1977). 
38. See Davidson, First Amendment Protection for Biomedical Research, 19 
Ariz. L. Rev. 893, 896-907 (1977). 
39. Prometheus, supra note 34, at 668-85. 
40. These rights would include: (a) the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), (b) family rights, Moore v. 
City of New East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), (c) the right to vote and have one's 
vote be worth as much as another's, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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Supporting this idea is a historical argument that the activi-
ties of scientific inquiry were considered of the highest stature 
during the period of the adoption of the Constitution and con-
tinue to be of the highest importance in today's society.41 
Given that the activities of science and individual scien-
tists receive some level of constitutional protection, is it possi-
ble for society to interfere with their use of animals in the 
laboratory? The answer is yes. No right, not even a funda-
mental right, is without limitations!2 To give research the sta-
tus of a constitutionally protected activity means only that in 
order to regulate it, the government must bear the burden of 
proving the existence of an overriding social interest. 43 If a 
scientist is an observer of distant stars, it is difficult to imag-
ine any social interest which would justify an interference 
with that scientific activity. If another scientist wishes to do 
research on the spread of bubonic plague bacillus among ur-
ban populations, the risk to human health would justify gov-
ernment restrictions. Finally, if a scientist uses live subjects in 
an experiment which creates a risk of pain and suffering for 
the subject, then some form of government restraint will be 
justified. Presuming for the moment that a concern for the 
pain and suffering of animals is an appropriate one for our 
government to assert, the parameters of possible government 
regulation remain to be determined. 
It should be noted that persons who engage in product 
41. Prometheus, supra note 34 at, 707-29. 
42. For example, the first amendment clearly provides for the right of individu-
als to petition the government as a fundamental right yet the Supreme Court has 
always recognized that limits to this right exist: 
Although the values in the right of petition as an important aspect of 
self-government are beyond question, it does not follow that the Framers of 
the First Amendment believed that the Petition Clause provided absolute 
immunity from damages for liable. . . . 
Nor do the Court's decisions interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts 
other than defamation indicate that the right to petition is absolute. For ex-
ample, filing a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity; but "base-
less litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition." 
McDonald v. Smith, 105 S. Ct. 2787, 2790-91 (1985). 
43. Without such constitutional protection any law passed by Congress would be 
presumed to be lawful and the burden of proving a particular restriction unconstitu-
tional would be on those individuals seeking to overturn the law. 
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testing are not engaging in the constitutionally protected ac-
tivities of scientific inquiry and therefore may be regulated as 
any other activity in the United States. This distinction can 
be made on the basis of the underlying purpose of the activ-
ity. The purpose of testing is not to obtain new insight con-
cerning the fundamental principles of the universe. Rather, a 
"test" is an activity seeking a specific bit of information con-
cerning a characteristic or purity or effect of a particular sub-
stance. Often they are performed because of legal require-
ments. 44 For example, monkeys are given the polio vaccine to 
determine the safety of a particular batch of vaccine. 4~ Even 
though the test is carried out using principles of scientific ex-
perimentation, it is not scientific activity, i.e. drug safety, not 
scientific discovery, .is the motivation for the activity. Since 
testing does not have the same purpose as scientific research, 
it is not protected as a fundamental activity. Congress may 
regulate testing as it does the transportation of animals46 or 
the slaughter of animals. 47 The public interest in protecting 
animals from pain and suffering becomes the dominant inter-
est, shifting the burden of showing no alternative to those who 
wish to use animals. 
IV. Ethical Concern for Animal 
Because of the lack of a centralized data collection point, 
it is difficult to estimate the total number of laboratory ani-
mals used in the United States. Part of the problem is that 
the vast majority of animals used in research are specifically 
bred for these purposes by private, profit making companies 
who do not reveal their sales data. The 1983 report under the 
federal Animal Welfare Act shows a total of 1,680,242 animals 
being used, but this includes only activities covered by the 
44. See generally Reagan, Federal Regulation of Testing with Laboratory Ani-
mals: Future Decisions 3 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 165 (1986). 
45. A. Rowan, Of Mice, Models, & Men: A Critical Evaluation of Animal Re-
search 117-20 (1984). 
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (Supp. III 1985). 
47. 7 U.S.C". §§ 1901-1906 (1982). 
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act, and excludes rats, mice and birds.'8 (It does show 54,926 
primates being used in experimentation, but this number may 
be a little high.) One experienced author estimates that sev-
enty million animals are used each year.'9 While some animals 
are used in more than one experiment, most are killed at the 
end of an experiment or test. 
The uses made of these animals defy the imagination of 
average people. Since there is almost no legal limitation on 
the use of animals by scientists, every possible use is made of 
them. They are shocked by electricity, poisoned, burned, in-
jected with hormones, separated, radiated, restrained, cut up, 
48. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Animal 
Welfare Enforcement FY 1983 10 (Mar. 1984) (report of the Secretary of Agriculture 
to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives). This 
report is required by the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2157. (1982 & Supp. 
1985). 
49. The following tables are found in A. Rowan, supra note 45, at 71: 
TABLE 5.6 
EsTIMATED LABORATORY ANIMAL UsE 
Mice 45 million 
Rats 15 million 
Hamsters 1 million 
Guinea pigs 1 million 
Rabbits 750,000 
Dogs 250,000 
Cats 100,000 
Primates 25,000 
Ungulates 200,000 
Birds 5 million 
Frogs 3 million 
Total 71.325 million 
SouRCE: Compiled from available data, excluding ILAR Survey. 
TABLE 5.7 
LABORATORY ANIMAL UsE 
63.1% 
21.0 
1.4 
1.4 
1.1 
0.4 
0.1 
0.04 
0.3 
7.0 
4.2 
100.0% 
Percentage Number (in millions) 
Teaching programs 
Research programs 
Toxicology programs 
Drug development programs 
Other programs 
8 
40 
20 
26 
6 
5.7 
28:5 
14.3 
18.5 
4.3 
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and any number of other actions110 which in any other setting, 
would constitute torture and violate most state cruelty laws.61 
The three examples at the beginning of this article are but a 
few of the many that could be cited.112 Not only are innumera-
ble animals subjected to pain and suffering, but the United 
States taxpayer pays a substantial portion of the cost for such 
research. 118 
The fact that numerous such experiments are conducted 
annually makes it obvious that specific individuals have de-
cided that it is morally and ethically appropriate to engage in 
research which results in the pain and suffering of animals. (It 
should be noted that not all animal research results in pain 
and suffering. Likewise, not all scientists support some of the 
painful research done by others.) Criticism by one scientist of 
the ethics of another has seldom occurred and when it has oc-
curred there has been little change. 
There are three issues which need to be addressed: (1) Is 
the use of animals in research ethically acceptable? (2) If 
there are situations where it is not acceptable, should society 
impose restrictions by the adoption of laws? (3) If some re-
50. Examine any primary scientific publication which reports research and focus 
on the animals and their use as set out by the protocol rather than the results of the 
experiment. Summaries of a number of experiments can be found in various books 
dealing with the topic of animals in research. See Animal Welfare Institute, supra 
note 1; Q. Pratt, Alternatives to Pain in Experiments on Animals (1980); A. Rowan, 
supra note 45. 
51. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. 
52. See J. Diner, Animal Rites: A Research Perspective (1986) (published by 
Nat'l Anti-Vivisection Soc'y); Ryder, Speciesism in the Laboratory, in In Defense of 
Animals 77-88 (P. Singer ed. 1985); A. Rowan, supra note 45, at 163-85. 
53. Records are not kept on government expenditure for animal research, how-
ever, the scope of such expenditures is indicated by biomedical research spending. 
Approximately $9 billion worth of biomedical research is conducted an-
nually in the United States. The major, single source of funding is the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH), which supported $3.55 billion worth of re-
search in 1981. The Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration 
supported a further $1.05 billion, while the rest of the Federal government 
allocated an estimated $1.5 billion to $2 billion. Private industry accounted 
for a further $2 billion to $2.5 billion, while nonprofit groups (such as private 
foundations and universities) accounted for a further $0.4 billion to $0.6 
billion. 
A. Rowan, sup~a note 45, at 21. 
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strictions are appropriate, how might they be drafted in order 
to comply with the limits of the Constitution? 
There are a number of suggestions concerning an ethical 
system that takes into account the interests of animals. M My 
argument and the thoughts which flow from it are within the 
mainstream of these various suggestions. The initial premise 
is that animals share an evolutionary tie with humans. There 
is a similarity in body and brain between the human animal 
and n~n-human animals that correlates with the evolutionary 
closeness of a species with homo sapiens. 66 In short, animals 
are alive in the same sense we are. Being alive, each individual 
animal has specific interests or preferences of activities. Ani-
mals eat, sleep, play, kill and engage in other behavior or ac-
tivities in accordance with their individual interests or prefer-
ences. A second premise is that animals feel pain in the same 
general sense that humans do. This premise is based upon the 
science of neurobiology68 and the common experience of ob-
serving animals that become hurt. 
There is a paradox in which science is trapped. The rea-
son that animals are used in many experiments and tests is 
that they are so similar to humans, yet scientists inflict pain 
and suffering on animals that would never be inflicted upon a 
human. Within the human context, the infliction of pain upon 
others without consent is unethical. This ethical view has 
been accepted within the legal system. It is both a part of 
criminal law and the law of torts. 67 Assuming that the pain 
felt by animals is of the same generic type as that felt by 
humans, should not our ethical system also preclude the in-
tentional infliction of pain upon animals? Are there any fac-
tors which would so distinguish human animals from non-
human animals that the interest of the nonhuman animal in 
54. T. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983); B. Rollin, Animal Rights and 
Human Morality (1981); In Defense of Animals (P. Singer ed. 1985). 
55. See Favre, Wildlife Rights: The Ever- Widening Circle, 9 Envtl. L. 241, 
259-64 (1979). 
56. See A. Rowan, supra note 45, at 74-92. See also Pratt, supra note 50, at 
11-30. See generally G. Shepherd, Neurobiology (1983). 
57. See Model Penal Code § 211 (1985); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. 
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 9-10 (5th ed. 1984). 
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avoiding pain can be totally ignored by humans? I can find 
none. 
On the other hand, science and the information it pro-
vides to our society is critical to the health and standard of 
living of many humans. Often animals have been the key to 
providing new insight about the world around us. The conflict 
is sharp: the ethical concern for animals versus the need of 
science to use animals in experiments that may ultimately 
benefit mankind. How should the differing interests be 
weighed? Do the ethical interests of animals weigh so heavily 
so as to eliminate any use of them by science? I think not. It 
is equally clear that their interest does have weight, more 
than enough to outweigh the whims of individual researchers 
or the desire of researchers and institutions to obtain fund-
ing.118 The premise upon which to build a statute is that ani-
mals should not have to endure the infliction of pain or suffer-
ing for the benefit of science except upon the specific decision 
of society that the sacrifice is one that is necessary for the 
benefit of society as a whole (as opposed to the benefit or curi-
osity of the scientist). 
The infliction of pain and suffering should only be al-
lowed as the result of a rational dialogue made in the public 
58. It should be pointed out that much of the use of animals is not motivated by 
the long-term good of society but by short-term personal need of the scientist. Dr. 
Samuel Peacock has stated: 
Research productivity has become the yardstick by which institutions, de-
partments and individuals are measured and evaluated. Indeed, research pro-
grams lend a sort of window dressing to what were at one time purely clinical 
departments. Frequently, evaluation is based on the number of publications, 
often quite regardless of quality or redundancy. Closely linked with this pub-
lication pressure is the talent of grantsmanship, the ability to obtain enor-
mous sums of money for funding research programs. These programs have 
become progressively more expensive with the development of highly sophis-
ticated techniques requiring specialized technicians to operate very complex 
equipment .... 
The survey in the succeeding pages covers many projects of this type, 
most of them motivated by the doctrine of "publish or perish." In my view, 
this is not science in the traditional sense but rather a kind of scientific pros-
titution in an attempt at empire building within a very competitive 
atmosphere. 
Peacock, Preface to Animal Welfare Institute Beyond the Laboratory Door at xiii-xv 
(1985). 
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view. If sound reasons for a particular experiment or tech-
nique can not be articulated, then it should not be allowed. 
This perspective creates a burden of proof upon the individ-
ual scientist to justify their use of animals. It allows some gov-
ernment decision maker to weigh the arguments of the scien-
tist against the interest of the animals. This is simply the 
recognition of an animal's interests by the providing of legal 
due process. Since animals are unable to make their own argu-
ments it will be necessary to provide a process in which other 
humans can argue on behalf of the animals. 
While the ethical considerations discussed above were 
without regard to specific species, the proposed legislation ac-
knowledges that primates are a special case. This is for a 
number of reasons. First of all, captive breeding programs do 
not work particularly well. As a result, a significant number of 
primates are imported annually from wild populations to sat-
isfy the demands of testing and research. 59 The importation 
59. 
TABLE 2 
UNITED STATES "NEW PRIMATE" REQUIREMENTS, 1981 
#of Animals Mortality Net Percent' 
Imported 22,454 12%' 19,759 62 
Domestic 
Production 8,645 10% 8 7,780 24 
PIC• 4,596 4,596 14 
Total 35,695 32,256 100 
Less re-exported• -4,000 -12 
"New primates"• 28,256 
1 Percent of total "new primates". 
• Estimated average mortality of imported animals. 
• Estimated average mortality between birth and weaning. 
• Approximately 4,000 primates exported from U.S. annually. 
• New animals available from all sources. 
• Placement of primates by Primate Information Clearinghouse (PIC). 
Source: Taken from Wolfle (1983) 
Eudey and Mack, Use of Primates and Captive Breeding Programs in the 
United States, in 1 International Primate Trade 156 (D. Mack & R. Mittermeir eds. 
1984) (a joint publication of TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), the World Wildlife Fund -U.S. Pri-
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process itself is both wasteful of the species and a significant 
source of pain and suffering for the individual animals in-
volved. It is not uncommon for adult primates to be killed in 
order to capture their young. Further, one study suggested a 
sixty-eight percent death rate during the capture and holding 
of primates in the source country.60 Additionally, there is a 
death rate of approximately seventeen percent during the im-
portation process prior to their being used. 61 Thus, there may 
be as much as two deaths for every imported primate that is 
ultimately used in science or testing. It is not difficult to pre-
sume significant suffering during the capture and transporta-
tion phase even for those that survive and are used in "pain-
less" research. 
Second, these animals are all protected as endangered or 
threatened under an international treaty.62 Yet, we have al-
lowed science and testing to create and maintain a significant 
market demand upon the wild populations. The spirit of the 
international agreements to protect wildlife would be best 
served if this demand were eliminated. 
A third reason to treat primates differently is to acknowl-
edge that, whatever their source, these animals are the most 
like humans. We evolved from common ancestors. We both 
have a social structure and strong mother-child bonding. It is 
almost impossible to create a laboratory environment that 
comes anything close to a natural setting. (Rats and mice can 
be provided with a rich and fulfilling living environment in a 
mate Program and the IUCN/SSC Primate Specialist Corp.). 
60. Kavanaugh, A Review of the International Primate Trade, in 1 International 
Primate Trade 62 (D. Mack & R. Mittermeir eds. 1984). 
61. 
According to information analyzed from Center for Disease Control Im-
port forms, 5,206 or 18.2% of the 28,558 primates imported into the U.S. in 
1978 were dead-on-arrival or died within 90 days of entering the country ... 
and in 1979, 3,818 or 17.1% of the 22,276 primates imported experienced 
comparable mortality. Mortality rates ranged from a low of 15.3% for all Af-
rican species in 1978 to a high of 25.1% for Neotropical species during the 
same year. 
Mack & Eudey, A Review of the U.S. Primate Trade, in 1 International Primate 
Trade 98-99 (D. Mack & R. Mittermeier eds. 1984). 
62. See infra note 65. 
HeinOnline -- 3 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 140 1985-1986
140 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3 
laboratory.) The present housing standards for primates are 
no more than a very small prison cell, without the opportunity 
for physical or mental exercise. There is nothing redeeming 
about their living conditions. There can be a presumption of 
suffering from the mere fact of laboratory confinement of pri-
mates. Therefore, they should not be subjected to testing or 
experiments except in the most extraordinary cases. 
V. A Statutory Proposal 
The proposed legislation found in Appendix A seeks to 
control animal use in testing and certain kinds of scientific 
research. The legislation seeks to be no more restrictive than 
is necessary. Therefore, it does not seek to bring within gov-
ernment review all scientific research or even all animal re-
search. Instead, it seeks to control all primate research and all 
research which has a significant risk of inflicting pain and suf-
fering on animals. 
The proposed legislation, as with all regulatory legisla-
tion, contains six components: 
a) statement of legislative policy - (§ 1), 
b) definitions of key terms - (§ 2), 
c) creation of regulatory authority and granting of admin-
istrative authority - (§ 3), 
d) operative provisions - (§§ 4-8), 
e) powers of enforcement - (§§ 9-10) 
f) penalty provisions - (§ 11). 
A. Section 1: Policy 
The policy statement of section one serves two different 
functions. First, it suggests that the law is constitutionally jus-
tified under three basis: as interstate trade,83 as a condition of 
federal funding,84 and as an extension of a treaty obligation.86 
63. Congress may not only regulate the actual interstate commerce of an item, 
but may also regulate the production and ultimate use of an item which passes 
through interstate trade. Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Tribe, Ameri-
can Constitutional Law 232-37 (1978). 
64. Since Congress does not have to give grants for scientific research and indi-
viduals are not obligated to receive the funds, Congress may impose rational condi-
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Second, section one sets out the broad policy which the suc-
ceeding sections seek to implement. In this case there is first a 
statement dealing with animals generally: 
It is, therefore, the policy of the United States that ani-
mals be subjected to pain and suffering for our collective 
benefit only when it has been established that no alterna-
tive exists and that the information gained is truly useful 
and necessary. 
The second statement deals with primates in particular.66 
It is, therefore, the policy of the United states that pri-
mates should not be used in any research or testing ex-
cept under the most extraordinary of circumstances. 
These broad statements are important because they tell the 
administrative decision maker what Congress considers to be 
important and what type of outcome is desired in the context 
of individual, specific decisions. It sets the tone for the admin-
istration of the law. 
The policy statement also begins to establish that the leg-
islation is concerned only with the methods of research, not 
with stopping the progress of science in any area. Although 
the actual structure of the proposed law would have to be 
looked at as well, the courts give considerable weight to what 
Congress states as the purpose of the legislation. 67 
tions, such as the care of animals, upon those receiving the funds. Of course not all 
research is funded by the federal government. For example, the Howard Hughes 
Medical Institute announced plans to spend one billion dollars for biomedical re-
search during 1986-1991. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1986, at 9 (nat'! ed.). 
65. It was established in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), that Congress 
has the power to pass legislation not otherwise justified under the Constitution when 
implementing an international treaty. The Convention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 
8249, list all primates as either endangered (Appendix I) or threatened (Appendix II). 
As a signatory of the treaty, the United States has a legal obligation to protect 
primates. 
66. See supra note 58-60 and accompanying text. 
67. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968); see also Tribe, supra 
note 63, at 591-98. 
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B. Section 2: Definitions 
The definitional section provides the contours of the leg-
islation. By examining the definition of "person" and 
"animal" a sense of scope may begin. Animal is defined by the 
listing of five specific categories: mammals, birds, fish, 
amphibians and reptiles. Within these groups, all of which 
contain a centralized nervous system and a brain, the percep-
tion of pain and suffering is of the same general nature as 
what we humans experience. To the extent that science pro-
vides us with the information that others within the animal 
kingdom are also subject to the infliction of pain and suffer-
ing, then the list should be expanded. The list also may reflect 
a judgement about how far protections can be extended, not 
as a matter of science but as a matter of political reality. 
The definition of "person" does not provide any limit to 
the application of the law. The definition is all inclusive. The 
only limiting factor will be what acts are performed by a "per-
son". In effect, no one is exempt from the operative provisions 
of the law. 
The definitions of pain and suffering are not to be judged 
by their biological accuracy but by their legal usefulness. 
There is significant debate as to just what constitutes pain 
and suffering.88 These definitions give broad guidelines to the 
Commission to decide when to apply the operative provisions 
of this Act. The courts are always available to correct any 
abuses by the Commission in making specific decisions. Addi-
tionally, the definitions try to focus on the important while 
excluding the trivial or truly disputed areas in defining pain 
and suffering. The legal definition would not include minimal 
or momentary pain such as arises in the receiving of an injec-
tion. For purposes of efficiency and consistency, the condi-
tions provided for under the federal Animal Welfare Act are 
presumed to not result in suffering, even though an argument 
might be made that certain provisions do result in animal suf-
68. See A. Rowan, supra note 45, at 74-92; D. Pratt, supra note 50, at 11-29; 
Wright, Marcella & Woodson, Animal Pain: Evaluation and Control, 14 Lab Animal 
20, 20 (May-June 1985). 
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fering. In part, these limitations on the definition are to as-
sure scientists that the law will not be able to interfere on 
trivial or unimportant points. There is enough significant pain 
and suffering imposed upon animals to make it ill-advised to 
devote resources to the trivial. 
C. Section 3: Administration 
One major decision which must be made when suggesting 
a government regulatory program is determining who should 
carry out the responsibilities of the law. Neither of the two 
agencies presently involved with animal research are appro-
priate for the new law. The Animal and Plant Health Inspec-
tion Service, within the Department of Agriculture, deals with 
the provisions of the Animal Welfare Act. They have been less 
than enthusiastic in carrying out their responsibilities under 
the Act.89 Additionally, while they have veterinarians in their 
69. 
Several examples of the Department of Agriculture's attitude are available. 
First, with every law that is implemented through regulation by an agency or 
department, there is considerable variability in the scope of the regulations 
which the agency may pass. An agency can do the minimum to comply with 
the law or it can push the goals and spirit of the law forward by producing 
regulations which are comprehensive, requiring the maximum from those 
who are regulated. The regulations under the A.W.A. are minimal. They are 
not assertive in protecting animal interests; they require only the bare mini-
mum. For example, the law requires the Secretary to be assured that profes-
sionally acceptable standards are being utilized by research facilities, yet the 
regulation contains no clear mechanism for obtaining such information .... 
A second place to take the pulse of an agency's level of commitment to a 
law is the area of enforcement. Again, the effort seems to be minimal at best. 
While the level of available funds do impact the ability to enforce, even at 
present levels very little seems to happen. The individuals regulated under 
the A.W.A. are given every possible opportunity to remove themselves from 
enforcement proceedings. This is not to say that specific individuals are not 
trying to enforce the Act. Rather this is a criticism of the burdensome pro-
cess the agency has imposed upon them. 
Perhaps the most telling example of the Department's attitude toward 
the A.W.A. is the administration's proposed budget for the 1986 fiscal 
year-zero funding. They want to repeal the law by not funding it. What 
dedicated, forward- looking civil servant would want to become involved with 
a zero-budgeted program? Even if the budget level was based more on polit-
ics than economics, it nonetheless tells everyone in the agency that the Secre-
tary and Executive branch give the care of animals zero priority. 
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service, they do not have the experience with scientific experi-
mentation which will be necessary to engage in the permit 
program being proposed. The other existing agency is the Na-
tional Institute of Health. As a major granting agency for 
animal research money, they certainly possess an understand-
ing of the scientific experimentation process. The problem is 
that this agency has always been opposed to any regulation of 
the use of animals in research. It seems unlikely that the poli-
cies of the proposed act would ever be aggressively pursued in 
such an environment. 70 
This is a new concern of the government. It is best to lo-
cate it where it has a fair chance of developing some adminis-
trative strength. The best thing to do is to create a new 
agency which can focus all of its energy and budget toward 
the goals of the legislation. In section three of the Act, the 
Commission on Laboratory Animals is created. Because of the 
newness of this issue and the desirability of having strong 
open public debate, a five member commission is created 
rather than having just a faceless administrator. The full com-
position of this Commission can be further debated. What is 
critical is that the general public be represented and that the 
interests of the animals be represented. Section three also 
gives the necessary administrative authority to the 
Commission. 
D. Sections 4-8: Operative Provisions 
Section four is the first of the operative provisions. This 
section sets out specific experimental techniques, such as the 
application of thermal burns, which may not be used on an 
animal that is conscious or will regain consciousness unless 
the "person" using the technique has a federal permit. The 
list of techniques or procedures triggering the need for a per-
mit may be expanded by the Commission. The government 
D. Favre, The Federal Animal Welfare Act: A Legal Analysis § 8.1 (Sept. 13, 1986) 
(unpublished manuscript). (To be published during 1987 by Michigan Humane Soci-
ety, Detroit.) 
70. It might be considered the old problem of having the fox guard the chicken. 
coop, but, of course, that is a slur on the character of foxes. 
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thus assumes the burden in the first instance of identifying 
where it will assert its regulatory authority. It would be an 
unnecessary overreaching of federal authority if a permit was 
required for all scientific experiments. Those techniques and 
procedures listed under this section are not meant to be a de-
finitive list, but rather representative of what might be listed. 
Once on the list, the burden shifts to the applicant to show 
that the prerequisites for a permit can be satisfied. 
Section five goes a step further by listing certain proce-
dures and techniques which are absolutely prohibited. In ef-
fect Congress will have weighed the pain and suffering against 
the prospect of new knowledge and decided that the possible 
gain is not worth the cost in pain and suffering to the animals 
that would be used. An example of this is the use of electric 
shock. By its very nature it is meant to produce pain. 
Whatever the usefulness of the procedure in the past, it is 
doubtful that the continued use of this technique is necessary 
for the advancement of science. 71 Again, the Commission is 
authorized to expand this list by regulation. As the public dis-
cussion becomes increasingly sophisticated and as science 
makes further progress, it is expected that other techniques 
will be considered ethically unacceptable. 
Section six sets out the provisions for a primate permit. 
Any use of a primate, whether a painful procedure or tech-
nique is used or not, requires a permit. Another major differ-
ence from the general experiment permit requirements is that 
for a primate permit the Commission must make the finding 
that the proposed research will potentially provide essential 
information for human or primate health (or deal with Ian-
71. The case against continued electric shock experiments, and all behavioral 
psychology, is forcefully presented in Animal Rights and Human Morality. B. Rollin, 
Animal Rights and Human Morality 124-30 (1981). 
[N]ot all basic research ought to be sanctified by the "right to know." There 
are certain things studied in the name of research that we already know; 
there are others that we do not need to know, most notably in the field of 
psychology .... This sort of research makes all research look bad, is method-
ologically suspect, can not be extrapolated to man, belabors the obvious,and 
can result in no conceivable benefit to human beings. 
/d. at 129. See also Dresser, Research on Animals: Values, Politics, and Regulatory 
Reform, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1147, 1158-59 (1985). 
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guage development). This is a value judgement which, while 
difficult to make, must occur before society can justify utiliz-
ing primates. A permit will not be issued if equivalent infor-
mation is available through other than animal research. For 
example, information may be available through the direct ob-
servation of humans, or by doing epidemiological surveys. 
Again there is a list of ethically unacceptable techniques or 
procedures which may not be used in any situation. 
Section seven deals with a related but separate topic, that 
of animals used in testing. The approach of this section is to 
set out national uniform standards which must be complied 
with for any testing. These standards, which forbid painful 
testing, must be developed and implemented within two years. 
The use of live animals in painful tests would be allowed for 
an additional two years if the Commission certifies that the 
test is essential for protecting human health and that alterna-
tives or substitute procedures are being sought. The imple-
mentation of this section should result in the ultimate elimi-
nation of painful testing procedures, most within two years, 
all within four years. This provision may be considered tech-
nology forcing. Congress can not be certain that adequate sub-
stitutes exist for painful animal testing but this provision will 
spur the development of new tests. If substitutes can not be 
found then Congress always retains the option of amending 
the statute. 
Section eight is meant to help clarify a confusing situa-
tion. It is unclear how much or what kind of testing or animal 
research is done to satisfy government requirements. Nor is it 
clear how much is in fact necessary to protect other public 
interests. Therefore, section eight directs the Commission to 
study this matter and report its findings to Congress. 
E. Sections 9-10: Powers of Enforcement 
Section nine provides the Commission with the authority 
to investigate and inspect facilities as may be required. This 
section presumes the continuing inspection service under the 
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Animal Welfare Act.72 It also allows the use of trained private 
citizens to do routine inspections in certain circumstances. 
Section ten is a critical component for the successful 
working of this legislation. It provides for full citizen partici-
pation. Citizens or organizations may petition the Commission 
to address whether or not certain procedures, techniques or 
tests should be listed and therefore controlled. They also have 
the right to bring issues of enforcement before the Commis-
sion and to participate in the permit process. This is a critical 
backstop for the effective operation of the legislation. It helps 
overcome staff shortages or shortcomings by allowing outside 
experts to be part of the process. Also, it fosters a full and 
open debate of all the major issues. 
F. Section 11: Penalties 
The final section, eleven, deals with enforcement and 
penalties. There is a strong parallel between these provisions 
and those of the Animal Welfare Act. Both civil and criminal 
penalties are provided for. Both the criminal and more serious 
civil penalties (including forfeiture of the animals) will come 
into play if any violation of any provision of the law, regula-
tions, or a permit results in pain or suffering to an animal. 
VI. The Constitutionality of the Laboratory Animal Act 
As previously discussed,73 scientific research can be con-
sidered to enjoy constitutional protection. However, a key dis-
tinction must be established between regulating the topic of 
research and regulating the methods of research. This distinc-
tion is critical in determining that the proposed statute is con-
stitutional. If the government passed a law banning research 
on high speed automobile accidents, it would not be upheld by 
the courts. Such a law would constitute an interference with a 
fundamental aspect of science, the right to choose the topic of 
72. To fully implement an inspection program, more money needs to be author-
ized by Congress. There is presently insufficient manpower to do an appropriate job. 
See General Accounting Office Report, The Dep't of Agric. Animal Welfare Program, 
GAOIRCED 85-8 (May 16, 1985). 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 34-43. 
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research. It would be an unauthorized prior restraint to the 
extent the law sought to restrain the development of ideas or 
the communication of ideas in this area.74 However, if Con-
gress passed a law prohibiting the use of live primates in auto-
mobile crash experiments, the courts would most likely up-
hold this law. Its goal would be to preclude harm to living 
animals, not to stop the gathering of knowledge through re-
search. Science has the right to pursue any topic of its choice, 
but it may not use any method of its choice in pursuit of the 
topic. Automobile crashes may be researched. Techniques re-
quiring the crushing of primates may be banned. To the ex-
tent that the inability to use primates makes it more difficult 
to obtain specific information, the law will be considered to 
create an incidental infringement on research. In certain cir-
cumstances this incidental infringement is lawful. 
United States u. O'Brienn was the first Supreme Court 
case to clearly set out the requirements which must be satis-
fied before a court will uphold, as constitutional, a law which 
has the effect of being an indirect restraint on a constitution-
ally protected right or activity.76 A government regulation or 
law which results in some restraint of a protected activity, like 
scientific research, is permissible if: 
1) it is within the constitutional power of the government, 
2) it furthers an important or substantial government 
interest, 
3) the government interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression (research), 
4) the restriction is incidental, 
5) it is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
74. For discussion of the concept of prior restraint see generally Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
75. 391 u.s. 367 (1968). 
76. ld. at 377. In this case the Court affirmed a conviction for destroying a draft 
card. The Court held that Congress has a legitimate and substantial interest in 
preventing the destruction of draft cards to insure the availability of registrants for 
induction. I d. at 380. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27, 47-48 (1976), where 
the impact of the Federal Election Campaign Act upon free political speech is dis-
cussed. The government interest asserted was that of a corruption-free election pro-
cess and therefore any restraints (spending limits) were incidental and therefore 
lawful. 
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the government interest.77 
The first element of the O'Brien test requires that the law 
in question be an appropriate exercise of constitutional au-
thority. As the discussion of section one of the Laboratory 
Animal Act pointed out, the act is grounded in the commerce 
clause, the budget power, and the treaty power.78 It is unlikely 
that a challenge to the Laboratory Animal Act based on the 
first element of the O'Brien test could be successful. The 
Animal Welfare Act which deals with similar subject matter 
has been upheld as constitutional.79 
The second element requires that the government regula-
tion further an "important or substantial government inter-
est" before an indirect restraint on a scientific activity is justi-
fied. If a human animal is involved the necessary government 
interest is present. With non-human animals the answer is a 
little less certain. 
By government regulation, human subjects of scientific 
experiments are protected.80 Humans cannot be used in ex-
periments without full disclosure of risk by the experimenter 
and informed consent of the subject. The protection of 
humans from unknown ·risks is clearly an important or sub-
stantial government interest. Does the protection of animals 
from unnecessary pain and suffering also rise to the level of an 
important or substantial governmental interest? In this au-
thor's estimation it should be so considered, but the ultimate 
test is how much weight the interest is given by the judge who 
might hear a case arising out of the LAA. At the moment it is 
questionable as to whether or not this interest would be 
judged to be important by those outside the animal rights, 
animal welfare movement. However, what is considered an 
important interest within our legal system evolves over time. 
Attitudes change as we focus on different problems and con-
flicts and as more information comes to our general attention. 
77. For a full discussion of these elements see Prometheus, supra note 34, at 
692-706. 
78. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
79. Haviland v. Butz, 543 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
80. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (1985). 
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Two examples of recently changing attitudes within the legal 
system include the importance of wetlands to the natural ecol-
ogy and the legal status of tenants in landlord tenant dis-
putes. 81 Our society is in the midst of awakening to the issues 
surrounding animals. Ten years ago it would have been very 
difficult to argue that the protection of animals was an impor-
tant government interest. Ten years from now it may be a rel-
atively easy argument to make. A good test of when the shift 
occurs will be when the legislation itself finds sufficient politi-
cal support to be adopted by Congress and signed by the 
President of the United States. Therefore, a final determina-
tion of this element of the O'Brien test will have to be put off 
until such time as the LAA is enacted and challenged in court, 
but the enactment itself will stand as compelling evidence 
that the protection of laboratory animals is an important gov-
ernmental interest. 
The third element of the O'Brien test requires that the 
governmental interest be unrelated to the protected activity. 
This element is clearly satisfied. The government interest is 
protection of animals. The protected activity is the develop-
81. Back in the 1950's and earlier, wetlands were usually referred to as marsh 
and swamp; areas without value. The first attempts to protect wetlands were struck 
down by the courts under the "takings" argument in part because the courts did not 
believe there was a societal interest in protecting them. As science provided more 
information about the value of the wetlands, the interest of society became heavier 
and more likely to uphold or justify the restrictions on private land owners. See 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 499 (1985); Am. Dredging 
Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 161 N.J. Super. 504, 391 A.2d 1265 (1978); 
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Maine v. Johnson, 
265 A.2d 711 (1970); F.Bosselman, D. Gallies and J. Banta, The Taking Issue 155-63 
(1973) (publication by Council on Environmental Quality). 
For many years urban tenants could seldom force landlords to take care of the 
leased property. The common law concept of caveat emptor put many burdens on the 
tenant while requiring payment of rent to the landlord without exception. During the 
late 1960's and early 1970's there was a substantial shift by society and the judicial 
system as to the interest and rights of tenants. They changed from a second class 
citizen to legal equality with the landlord. Tenants now have an assortment of legal 
concepts to aid them in the struggle for decent housing. (i.e., the implied warranty of 
habitability). See, Javins v. First Nat'! Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, cert. denied. 400 
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 
1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Schowhinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant 
§ 3.16 (1980). 
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ment and dissemination of knowledge. There is no support for 
an argument that the government's real purpose here is to in-
terfere with science.811 
The fourth element is satisfied because, although the 
LAA is comprehensive within the area of prevention of pain 
and suffering in laboratory animals, when compared to the 
broader world of scientific research the resulting interference 
is merely incidental. The LAA does not seek to preclude a 
scientists from pursuing any topic of research they may de-
sire. Instead, it limits the type of procedures and techniques 
which may be used by persons in the gathering of information. 
The number of absolute prohibitions is modest, for the most 
part the LAA would regulate the use of animals in research. 
Finally, there is no restraint on the communication of ideas or 
theories, that aspect of science of which the courts would ex-
pect to be most protective. 
The final element of the test requires that the restrictions 
be no more burdensome than is necessary to accomplish the 
goals of the law. The LAA does not require federal permits for 
all scientific experiments, or even all experiments which use 
animals. The LAA is carefully limited to those aspects of re-
search which may involve causing pain and suffering to ani-
mals. The permit procedures and requirements are carefully 
drawn to interfere with science no more than necessary. In 
this way, the fifth element of the O'Brien test is satisfied. The 
law is no more burdensome than is necessary to address the 
governmental interest. 
Since all of the elements of the O'Brien test are satisfied 
or are expected to be satisfied, the proposed law is a lawful 
82. 
The requirement that the government's asserted interest must be unre-
lated to the suppressio.n of free expression is really only another way of say-
ing that the regulation must be facially neutral; that is, it must not state or 
imply an intent to suppress ideas or information. It has been argued by com-
mentators that even a facially neutral regulation may be struck down if it 
was motivated by an intent to directly abridge speech. The right of free ex-
pression would be meaningless if the government could accomplish indirectly 
that which it could not accomplish directly. The Supreme Court, however, 
has shown an unwillingness to examine the motives of legislative bodies. 
Prometheus, supra note 34, at 694 (citations omitted). 
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and ethically mandated act of legislation. 
VII. Conclusion 
The LAA as set out in Appendix A represents the next 
logical step for a society with increasing concern over the use 
of animals in scientific experimentation. The present Animal 
Welfare Act seeks to protect animals from unnecessary pain 
and suffering. It is as protective as possible while still allowing 
the specific decisions to be private. The LAA would take the 
next step by making the use of animals in certain circum-
stances a public decision. Passage of the LAA will be signifi-
cant proof of our society accepting the concept that animals 
have individual interests which we humans have an ethical 
duty to recognize through our legal system. 
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Appendix A: Laboratory Animal Act 
§ 1. Statement of Policy 
153 
Congress acknowledges the important role that animals 
play in scientific research and testing. Most of these animals 
travel through interstate commerce. Much of the research is 
either done by federal agencies or private parties with federal 
monies. It also recognizes that animals have been subjected to 
significant pain and suffering as a result of human activities in 
the laboratory. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States 
that animals be subjected to pain and suffering for our collec-
tive benefit only when it has been established that no alterna-
tive exists and that the information gained is truly useful and 
necessary. 
Additionally, it is acknowledged that primates, as our 
closest evolutionary kin in the animal world are deserving of 
special protection. Primates are unique in that they are one of 
the few laboratory animals for which wild specimens must still 
be obtained. Our obligations under international agreements 
are to protect endangered species. All primates are listed as 
either endangered (Appendix I) or threatened (Appendix II) 
under the international treaty. It is, therefore, the policy of 
the United States that primates should not be used in any 
research or testing except under the most extraordinary of 
circumstances. 
§ 2. Definitions. 
When used in this chapter: 
(a) The term "animal" includes all mammals, birds, fish, 
amphibians, reptiles, and such other creatures as may be des-
ignated by the Commission. 
(b) The term "Commission" refers to the Commission on 
Laboratory Animals. 
(c) The term "pain" refers to those neuron signals trans-
mitted from nociceptors found throughout the body to the 
brain (i.e. the thalamus and somatosensory cortex) at suffi-
cient strength to be considered a negative stimulus and result-
ing in the animal seeking to withdraw from the source of pain. 
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It includes both sharp pain and chronic pain. It does not in-
clude such minimal or momentary pain as might arise from 
the giving of injections or taking of blood samples. It is pre-
sumed that surgery will produce pain and that animals recov-
ering from surgery will experience pain. The euthanasia of an 
animal by a technique set out in a regulation of the Commis-
sion shall be presumed to not result in pain. 
(d) The term "person" includes any individual, partner-
ship, firm, company, corporation, association, organization, or 
other legal entity, whether foreign or domestic, including any 
department, agency, subdivision or instrumentality of the fed-
eral or a state government. 
(e) The term "testing" refers to a repetitive procedure or 
technique which is used to identify the presence or absence of 
a substance or to determine a particular characteristic or ef-
fect or purity of a substance. For purposes of this chapter only 
those procedures or techniques which use live animals shall be 
considered tests. 
(0 The term "suffering" refers to a general state of an 
animal where, because of environmental factors, including but 
not limited to pain, temperature, lack of proper food or water, 
withdrawal of appropriate sensory input, withdrawal from 
needed social contact, or inability to engage in normal postur-
ing, the animal would be expected to experience stress, ten-
sion, anxiety, fear, frustration or exhaustion. The housing of 
animals in accordance with the Animal Welfare Act shall be 
presumed not to create a condition of suffering. 
§ 3. Administrative Authority and Duty to Cooperate. 
(a) There is hereby created the Commission on Labora-
tory Animals. The Commission shall consist of five members. 
The members shall be appointed by the President of the 
United States to serve staggered four year terms. The compo-
sition of the Commission shall reflect a diversity of views and 
interest and shall have representatives from an animal welfare 
organization and the general public. The Commission may 
employ a full time Administrator to carry on the day-to-day 
activities of the organization. 
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(b) The Commission is authorized to promulgate such 
rules, regulations and orders as it may deem necessary in or-
der to accomplish the purpose of this Act. 
(c) The Commission shall consult and cooperate with 
other federal departments, agencies, or instrumentalities con-
cerned with the welfare of animals used in research, experi-
mentation or testing when establishing standards under this 
title or otherwise carrying out the purpose of this chapter. 
(d) All federal departments, agencies, or instrumentalities 
concerned with the welfare of animals used in research, exper-
imentation or testing or having information concerning re-
search, experimentation or testing by private persons shall 
provide information and data when so requested by the 
Commission. 
§ 4. Permits for Certain Procedures and Techniques. 
(a) Any person who uses animals obtained in interstate 
commerce, or federal money for animal research or experi-
mentation, or the results of animal experimentation to satisfy 
any federal law or regulation and who uses any of the proce-
dures or techniques listed in this section must first obtain a 
general experiment permit from the Commission before sub-
jecting an animal to such procedure or technique. At an edu-
cational institution or research facility which receives federal 
money for animal research, the individual with primary re-
sponsibility for the specific research experiment in question 
shall obtain a permit. 
(b) Experiments and research using the following proce-
dures or techniques shall require a permit if an animal will be 
conscious at any time during or after the application of the 
technique. 
(1) Application of any chemical irritant, including acids, 
to any part of the animal. 
(2) The application of thermal burns. 
(3) The use of radiation. 
(4) The shooting of any animal with a projectile. 
(5) Any cutting of neuron connections within the brain. 
(6) Any tail pinching. 
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(7) Any implantation of medical devices. 
(c) The Commission shall add, by regulation, to this list 
of research procedures and techniques when it finds that the 
application of the procedure or technique is likely to produce 
or result in pain. A technique may also be listed if the Com-
mission finds that there is a risk that a particular technique 
may be misused resulting in pain to animals, or if the proce-
dure or technique will result in suffering for an animal. 
(d) A general experiment permit for a specific period of 
time shall be issued by the Commission only after making the 
following findings: 
(1) There is no alternative technique which will produce 
the same quantity and quality of information. 
(2) That specific knowledge is sought, not random 
information. 
(3) That the simplest appropriate biological system is be-
ing used. 
(4) That the smallest feasible number of animals is being 
used. 
(5) That the experimenter has the appropriate back-
ground, by education or experience, to work with the 
animal proposed. 
(6) That there are sufficient institutional resources avail-
able to support the research or experimentation as 
well as the care of the animals. 
(7) That the individual has not previously been found to 
have violated this chapter as provided for in § ll(b) 
or any portion of the Animal Welfare Act which deals 
with the care and housing of animals in the preceding 
five years. Additionally, a permit may be denied if the 
proposal is the repetition of a previous experiment or 
research which has already been shown to be repro-
ducible by other persons. The Commission may by 
regulation establish categories of research for which it 
shall be presumed that further repetition is 
unjustified. 
(e) The Commission may request such information from 
an applicant as is necessary to make the findings required 
under this section. 
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(f) If a particular procedure or technique using the appro-
priate type and amount of anesthetic, analgesic or tranquiliz-
ing drugs would not be painful to an animal, and if the re-
search or experiment complies with the guidelines hereinafter 
established by the Commission for the use of such drugs, then 
a general experiment permit will not have to be obtained. For 
purposes of this chapter the Commission shall establish guide-
lines by regulatory process which set out the appropriate 
chemicals and their dosage level to be used for each species of 
animal by sex, age and weight, which may be used as an anes-
thetic, analgesic, or tranquilizer in research, experimentation, 
or testing. 
(g) In granting a general experiment permit, the Commis-
sion may add such conditions as are necessary to assure that 
any animals are protected from unintended pain and 
suffering. 
§ 5. Prohibited Procedures and Techniques. 
(a) The use of the following procedures and techniques or 
ones hereafter added to the list by the Commission are unlaw-
ful and may not be used by any individual upon any animal: 
(1) Permanent or temporary blindness by closure of the 
eye. 
(2) Induction of shock trauma by a rolling drum. 
(3) Artificial stimulation of aggression. 
( 4) Sleep deprivation. 
(5) Use of hot plates which produce burns. 
(6) Use of restraint chairs. 
(7) Use of electric shock. 
(8) Infliction of pain or distress to modify or control be-
havior unless the animal has the ability to exercise to-
tal aversion to the stimulus. 
(b) The Commission shall add to this list those proce-
dures and techniques which they find present a risk of signifi-
cant pain and suffering in animals and are either not neces-
sary because of the availability of alternate procedures and 
techniques or offer the prospect of only diminutive new 
knowledge. 
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§ 6. Primate Experiment Permits. 
(a) It is unlawful for any person to use a primate in scien-
tific research or experimentation without a primate permit 
from the Commission. 
(b) An application for a primate permit shall contain 
whatever information the Commission determines is necessary 
to make a fully informed decision. 
(c) A primate experiment permit shall not be granted un-
til the applicant has shown the following: 
(1) That a primate is the only species suitable for the pro-
posed research or experimentation. 
(2) That the proposed research or experiment will poten-
tially provide essential information for human or pri-
mate health or will study primate communication 
skills without invasive procedures. 
(3) That the equivalent expenditure of money and effort, 
not involving animal research, could not be expected 
to produce equivalent information. 
(4) That the experimenter is fully qualified by training or 
experience to deal with the proposed primate. 
(5) That the institution where the research or experiment 
will occur has sufficient resources to assure the well 
being of all primates. 
(d) The Commission shall not grant a prjmate experiment 
permit if it involves the following techniques or procedures: 
(1) Restraint chair. 
(2) Separation of infants from mothers. 
(3) Electric shock. 
(4) Any technique or procedure listed under section five 
(§ 5) of this Act or listed by the Administrator under 
subsection 5(b). 
(5) Any transfer of organs from primates to humans. 
(6) Any implant of medical devices, unless for the benefit 
of the primate. 
(7) The crushing of the skull or portions of the brain by 
application of force to the skull. 
(8) ·Any permanent destruction of any portion of the cen-
tral nervous system. 
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(9) The amputation of any portion of the animal. 
(e) The conditions of any proposed research or experi-
ment including the housing of primates shall take into ac-
count their social nature. 
(f) No primate experiment permit shall be for longer than 
a two year period. 
(g) In the granting of a primate permit the Commission 
may add such conditions as are necessary for the protection of 
the interests of the primates. 
§ 7. Testing with Animals. 
(a) No live animal shall be used in scientifically con-
ducted testing initiated two years after the effective date of 
this legislation except in accordance with the provisions of 
subsection (b). 
(b) The Commission shall adopt and publish a list of tests 
and acceptable testing procedures 18 months from the effec-
tive date of this legislation. The list may be modified thereaf-
ter as is necessary to take into account new information. 
(c) Before adding a testing procedure to the published 
list, the Commission must determine that: 
(1) The procedure does not inflict pain upon the animal 
after the appropriate use of anesthetics, analgesics, or 
tranquilizing drugs. 
(2) The purpose of the test is important to human or 
animal health. 
(3) The procedure produces a consistent, useful result. 
(4) The appropriate species and number of animals is 
used. 
(d) Any animal testing which is painful to the subject 
animal must cease within two years after the effective date of 
this legislation, except that a test may be allowed for an addi-
tional two year period provided that the Commission shall 
certify that the test is essential for protecting human health, 
that no alternative presently exists, and that at least one pro-
ject for seeking an alternative to the painful test is funded 
and underway. 
(e) Notwithstanding any other portion of this section the 
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following tests shall be unlawful to perform: 
(1) Draize eye irritancy test. 
[Vol. 3 
(2) The classical LD50 test (as opposed to the approxi-
mate lethal dose test). 
(f) If a test does not qualify for listing but is apparently 
required by federal law, then the Commission shall notify 
Congress as per the provisions of § 8. 
§ 8. Government Required Testing. 
(a) The Commission shall report to Congress one year af-
ter the effective date of this Act setting forth all of the provi-
sions of federal law which require animal research, experimen-
tation or testing. The Commission shall also include 
recommendations as to whether or not the required use of ani-
mals is still necessary or may be modified, given the public 
policy of this chapter. 
(b) The Commission shall be an advocate for non animal 
research or testing or minimal use of animals before any fed-
eral agency, department or instrumentality which has re-
quired or might in the future propose the requirement of 
animal research or testing by any regulation. The Commission 
shall review and comment upon any proposed federal regula-
tion dealing with animal research and testing. 
(c) The Commission shall seek to participate, whenever 
possible, in any international organization, or foreign govern-
ment standard setting process or the development of guide-
lines which will require the use of animals in research and 
testing and will be binding on United States corporations and 
other persons engaged in the foreign sale of any product. If 
the Commission does so participate, it shall foster the policies 
of this Act. 
§ 9. Inspections and Investigations. 
(a) The Commission shall make such investigations or in-
spections as it deems necessary to determine whether or not 
any person has violated or is violating any provision of this 
chapter or any regulation or standard issued thereunder, and 
for such purposes, the Commission and its agents shall have 
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reasonable access to places where animal experimentation or 
testing is carried out or where the Commission reasonably be-
lieves animal experimentation or testing may be occurring. 
The Commission shall promulgate such rules and regulations 
as it deems necessary to permit inspectors to confiscate or de-
stroy in a humane manner any animal found to be in pain or 
suffering as a result of a failure to comply with the provisions 
of this chapter or any regulation or any standard or any per-
mit issued under this Act. 
(b) Any person who forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, im-
pedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person while en-
gaged in or on account of the performance of his or her official 
duties under this chapter shall be fined not more than $5,000, 
or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Whoever, in 
the commission of such acts, uses a deadly or dangerous 
weapon shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned 
not more than 10 years, or both. Whoever kills any person 
while engaged in or on account of the performance of his or 
her official duties under this chapter shall be punished as pro-
vided under sections 1111 and 1114 of Title 18. 
(c) For the efficient administration and enforcement of 
this chapter, the Commission shall have the power to issue 
subpoenas for the attendance of persons or the production of 
documents. 
(d) For purposes of gathering useful information the 
Commission may require those individuals using animals in 
research and testing to provide information through the use of 
one time surveys or through periodic reports not more often 
than annually. 
(e) The Commission may establish regulations under 
which specific enforcement personnel of Humane Societies or 
Societies for the Protection of Animals can be authorized 
agents of the Commission for the purpose of regular inspec-
tions of facilities used by permit holders or other inspections 
as may be specifically requested by the Commission. No indi-
vidual may become an authorized agent without proof of ap-
propriate training and education. 
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§ 10. Citizen Participation. 
(a) Any person, including any non-profit organization 
formed for the protection of animals, has the right to engage 
in the following activities: 
(1) Petition the Commission to consider the regulatory 
listing, delisting, or modification of a specific tech-
nique, procedure or test under § 4(c), § 5(b) or § 7(b). 
(2) Petition the Commission to investigate potential vio-
lations of this chapter or regulations, standards or 
permits issued thereunder. 
Within 90 days from receipt of the petition the Commis-
sion shall give notice of its intent to proceed with the re-
quested action or its intent not to proceed with the requested 
action in which case the reasons for the denial shall be clearly 
stated. 
(b) Any person, including any non-profit organization 
formed for the protection of animals, has the right to submit 
comments and information upon any application for a permit 
or any proposed regulation under this chapter. Such com-
ments and information shall be considered by the Commission 
prior to acting on the matter. 
(c) Except for the granting of a general experimental per-
mit, any person who has been a participant in any of the pro-
ceedings described in subsections (a) and (b) may appeal a 
final determination of the Commission to the appropriate Dis-
trict Court in accordance with the Administrative Procedure 
Act. 
§ 11. Enforcement and Penalties. 
(a) The United States district courts, the District Court 
of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the highest 
court of American Samoa, and the United States courts of the 
other territories, are vested with jurisdiction specifically to en-
force, and to prevent and restrain violations of this chapter, 
and shall have jurisdiction in all other kinds of cases arising 
under this chapter, except as provided in sections ll(b) and 
ll(c) of this title. 
(b) Any person who violates any provision of this chapter, 
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or any rule, regulation, standard, or permit promulgated or is-
sued by the Commission shall be subject to civil fine assessed 
by the Commission of not more than $5,000 for each such vio-
lation. Each day that a violation continues to exist shall be a 
separate offense. No penalty shall be assessed unless such a 
person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing with re-
gard to such alleged violation. The order of the Commission 
assessing a penalty and making a finding shall be final and 
conclusive unless the affected person files an appeal from the 
Commission's order with the appropriate United States Court 
of Appeals. If the Commission makes a finding that a person 
knowingly violated any provision of this chapter, or any rule, 
regulation, standard or permit promulgated or issued by it 
and that such violation resulted in pain or suffering to an 
animal, the individual shall not qualify for any permit under 
this chapter for a period of five years, and may be required to 
forfeit ownership of the animal or animals in question. In set-
ting the level of a fine the Commission shall take into account 
the gravity of the violation, in particular whether or not ani-
mals were subjected to pain and suffering, the person's good 
faith or lack thereof, and any history of previous violations. 
Upon any failure to pay the penalty assessed by a final order 
under this section, the Commission shall request the Attorney 
General to institute a civil action in a district court of the 
United States in which such person is found, resides or trans-
acts business, to collect the penalty. 
(c) Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Commis-
sion issued pursuant to this section may, within 60 days after 
entry of such order, seek review of such order in the appropri-
ate United States Court of Appeals in accordance with the 
provisions of sections 2341, 2343 through 2350 of Title 28, and 
such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, 
suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of 
the Commission's order. 
(d) Any person who knowingly violates any provision of 
this chapter or any rule, regulation, standard or permit 
promulgated or issued by the Commission which results in 
pain and suffering to an animal shall, on conviction thereof, 
be subject to imprisonment for not more than two years or a 
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fine of not more that $10,000, or both. With the consent of the 
Attorney General, any action under this subsection may be 
conducted, both at trial and upon appeal by attorneys of the 
Commission on Laboratory Animals. 
